There is no definitive approach to assessing the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. In order to explore the regime established by the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution this article broadly integrates the approach to effectiveness taken by Peter H. Sand in The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements, and Daniel Bodansky in The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law. The article finds that compliance, institutional, and normative effectiveness can be evaluated relatively confidently. An effectiveness assessment of the long-range transboundary air pollution (LRTAP) regime indicates that, on the whole, it has helped states to reach agreement on contentious issues and achieve results in air pollution reduction. However, it faces significant challenges with regard to participation, implementation procedures, empowerment of domestic stakeholders, and funding. The article provides an in-depth and up-to-date look at the LRTAP regime, including the most recent amendments and its relationship with European Union and international law.
introduction
November 2014 marked the 35 th anniversary of the adoption of the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP), 1 negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). This major regional multilateral environmental agreement (MEA), with its eight Protocols, has evolved into a notable environmental regime. 2 The long-range transboundary air pollution (LRTAP) regime attempts to address a number of environmental and health problems caused by industrialization, agricultural modernization, and fossil fuel consumption. 3 This includes the effects of acidification, photochemical smog, ground-level ozone, eutrophication, fine particulate matter (PM 2.5 , particularly black carbon, a shortlived climate forcer), and contamination by toxic chemicals.
Scholarly opinions on the effectiveness of the LRTAP regime have varied. 4 This article has three major objectives: to give an overview of the regime, to assess its effectiveness from the standpoint of current thinking in international environmental law, and to think critically about how the effectiveness of regimes is assessed. The current effectiveness discourse is based on interconnected yet separate groupings: legal, normative, problemsolving, institutional, political, and economic effectiveness. 5 Given this fragmentation, it has been argued that the positivist approach to effectiveness is the most suitable, with normative considerations less relevant, and approaches based on quantitative methods suffering from reductionism. 6 Two decades ago, Sand's criteria for effectiveness focused 2 Regime is understood as the 'norms, rules, and procedures agreed to in order to regulate an issue-area', as per E.B. Haas, 'Why Collaborate?: Issue-Linkage and International Regimes Source' (1980) 32(3) World Politics, pp. 357-405, at 358. 3 The CLRTAP defines air pollution as 'the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the air resulting in deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human health, harm living resources and ecosystems and material property and impair or interfere with amenities and other legitimate uses of the environment'. LRTAP is 'air pollution whose physical origin is situated wholly or in part within the area under the national jurisdiction of one State and which has adverse effects in the area under the jurisdiction of another State at such a distance that it is not generally possible to distinguish the contribution of individual emission sources or groups of sources': Art. 1(a) and (b) CLRTAP. 4 on the treaty objectives and their achievement, the rules and processes concerning state participation, implementation, information sharing, the provisions for operation, review and adjustment, and codification programming (including both formal and informal instruments). 7 The conceptual approach has subsequently been broadened. Bodansky has identified four major determining factors of effectiveness: (i) the nature of the problem; (ii) the international political system; (iii) the characteristics of the countries involved; and (iv) the design of the regime. As Bodansky notes, there is a belief that regime design (the 'institutional and legal characteristics' of a regime) plays an important role in determining effectiveness. 8 Bodansky cautions, however, that in light of 'the extent that states trade off different design elements against one another, we cannot analyze these elements in isolation; we need to consider them as a whole'. 9 The current inability to resolve how the trade-offs should be made, with each problem having its own particular dynamics and the end product reflecting a necessary compromise, is suggestive to Bodansky of international environmental law being 'an art and a craft', rather than a panacea. 10 The respective approaches of Sand and Bodansky overlap considerably. This article merges the two to analyze the effectiveness of the LRTAP regime and test the robustness of Sand's and Bodansky's criteria, focusing on three main areas. 11
Legal effectiveness
Legal effectiveness relates to compliance and to what is being complied with. High levels of compliance are indicative of behavioural change and, by association, effectiveness. 12 This approach can engage with ideas such as ambitiousness, treaty content, the environmental outcomes, and even the 'spirit' of the instrument. 13 Legally precise rules reduce ambiguity and highlight cases of non-compliance more easily, while the types of commitment (or regulatory framework) will exert a strong influence over whether the problem is resolved. Related to the issue of content, the legality of the instruments also contributes to effectiveness. Binding instruments are generally considered the most effective. However, soft law instruments have political and legal significance, allowing states to participate in times of uncertainty (lack of political agreement, for example), thereby increasing the potential for behavioural change. 14
Institutional effectiveness
Institutional effectiveness focuses on the ability of the regime to create a cooperative approach, which promotes and assists states in reaching compliance. 15 Lack of cooperation, and inadequate means to increase compliance through rules, procedures, and institutions for reporting, monitoring and review, dispute settlement, and noncompliance, will ultimately undermine effectiveness. 16
Normative effectiveness
The normative approach is an assessment of the regime's achievement in, or reflection of, normative principles such as justice, fairness and participation. 17 Procedural justice is viewed as the basis for legitimacy, which should produce greater compliance. 18 Such an analysis can consider the legitimacy and fairness of the rules concerning participation and decision making, the participation of all the relevant states, the assignment of implementation responsibilities, the degree of burden sharing, and financial assistance. 19 Included in this is the extent to which the regime empowers domestic supporters through, for example, a role in decision making or the policy process. This is a way of increasing legitimacy, improving the quality of decisions, and achieving a greater degree of consensus. 20 2. examining the legal effectiveness of the lrtap regime
The Commitments and Compliance
During the negotiations for the CLRTAP, polluting states staunchly opposed the sulphur dioxide (SO 2 ) reduction targets that were needed to control acid rain. 21 The compromise reached to ensure their participation resulted in a 'loose' framework convention 22 that, as Rosencranz noted, contained 'no numerical goals, limits, timetables, abatement measures or enforcement provisions'. 23 Instead, the Convention laid out the procedural framework, with significant provisions on 'notification and consultation, research, use of control technology, monitoring of pollutants and rainfall'. 24 In Article 2, the contracting parties agreed in vague and flexible language that 'taking due account of the facts and problems involved', they were 'determined to protect man and his environment against air pollution and shall endeavour to limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution including long-range transboundary air pollution'. 25 As a significant 'first step' towards firm obligations to control and reduce air pollution and LRTAP, 26 the majority of the original parties have adhered to the vague general obligation expressed in Article 2but assessing compliance poses some difficult analytical problems. Ultimately, the successful adoption of the Protocols has determined the significance and effectiveness of the Convention. 27 The Protocols are characterized by good levels of compliance (see Table 1 in the Appendix to this article). 28 From a simple compliance perspective, the regime is effective because the contracting parties in general have fulfilled their commitments, bar a few cases of non-compliance concerning data reporting and the reduction of individual pollutants. The commitments on nitrogen oxide (NO X ), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and persistent organic pollutants (POPs) have proved difficult for some states to achieve. 29 The Protocols were recently amended; this is addressed in Section 2.4.
Implementation and the importance of the European Union
European Union (EU) air pollution law was partly adopted to fulfil the commitments under the LRTAP regime. 30 The EU (formerly the European (Economic) Community (EEC/EC)) acceded to the majority of the Protocols, but lacked the required support to approve the 1985 Sulphur Protocol I 31 and the 1991 VOCs Protocol. 32 After the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, 33 EU policy on the environment became the driving force in the internal EU context, with the LRTAP instruments supplementing this process.
Law and policy relevant to LRTAP did exist in the EU prior to the adoption of the CLRTAP in 1979 34 and, during the period 1980 to 1992, the EU legislated on a broad range of pollutants, with a focus on pollution sources. 35 46 EU law has certainly gone beyond the boundaries of the LRTAP regime, but its developments still reflect the spirit of the regime, particularly the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol 47 in the recent period. 48 There is a significant degree of overlap and linkage between the EU and the LRTAP regime in terms of the institutions, participating states, the actors involved, and the norms and rules. 49 The latter still has a significant advantage in terms of its broader international membership. 50 Nonetheless, the EU has made substantial contributions to the effectiveness of the LRTAP regime.
The Use of Binding/Non-binding Instruments
Non-binding instruments played a key role in the regime's early formation. For example, Sweden and a group of like-minded states agreed to reduce their sulphur emissions by 30% (the '30% Club') in the Declaration on Acid Rain 1984. 51 Motivated by the slow progress at the international level and their desire to move forward on the effects of acid rain, the 30% Club gained political leverage and shamed uncooperative states. It significantly influenced the development of the 1985 Sulphur Protocol I, 52 which replicated the 30% commitment. 53 However, when a similar approach was taken four years later with the Sofia Declaration on 30% Reduction of NO X Emissions, 54 adopted concurrently with the 1988 NO X Protocol, 55 the limitations of non-binding instruments became apparent. Only three of the 12 states that adopted the Sofia Declaration achieved the 30% reduction in NO X emissions by 1998, and the Declaration had little effect on NO X reductions. Furthermore, it did not influence the regime's implementation strategies, which were advancing towards national emissions ceilings (NECs) by the early 1990s and no longer required generic across-the-board reductions for NO X . 56 The difference in impact between the Declaration on Acid Rain and the Declaration on 30% Reduction of NO X Emissions may well be explained by their different origins. The former was an attempt led by Scandinavian states to move the regime towards binding commitments, whereas the latter was heavily backed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This may explain why state incentives to comply were low. 57 In terms of effectiveness, the LRTAP regime conforms with Bodansky's assertion that non-binding instruments tend to be used at regime formation, and can contribute to 'learning by doing'. 58 However, there is evidently a trade-off between legality and participation. As the regime has evolved, binding instruments have produced the more sophisticated elements (NECs, for example). EU law has also firmed up the LRTAP commitments, for the EU Member States at least. Contrasted to this is the lack of participation by some of the countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA), which may be better served by soft law instruments. These could maintain the regime's profile and provide the states with political leverage to gain financial and technical support from the advanced economies. To some extent, this is now occurring through the establishment of the EECCA Coordinating Group. 59 Each case is singular and involves specific trade-offs, which makes it extremely problematic to evaluate how effectively a regime uses non-binding instruments, or whether the binding/non-binding ratio is optimal. Nevertheless, it would appear that, on balance, the regime has benefited from the use of binding instruments, although there is scope to use non-binding instruments more effectively to foster participation in the regime.
The Precision of the Rules
The Convention and its Protocols moved from vagueness to precision as the regime matured. The Convention's substantive provisions are mandatory, yet represent general principles as opposed to firm commitments as a result of the presence of qualifying clauses and soft law expressions. This generates vagueness: it is difficult to ascertain specific cases of non-compliance. 60 However, imprecision is also an asset, for it provides flexibility and facilitates participation in the Convention process. From this perspective, the Convention arguably is effective not despite but because of its vagueness. 61 The Protocols contain precise rules and fewer qualifying expressions. The 30% Club viewed binding commitments as providing the best outcome for the UK 
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Transnational Environmental Law, 4:1 (2015), pp. 37-67 environment. In Article 2 of the 1985 Sulphur Protocol I 62 states agreed to reduce 'national annual sulphur emissions or their transboundary fluxes by at least 30 per cent' of 1980 levels. 63 The shift to firm reduction commitments raised the stakes and resulted in parties deciding not to accede to the Protocol, including a number of key states such as Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and Yugoslavia. However, although legally precise, scholars have questioned the Protocol's real impact. It has been suggested that the 30% target was achieved primarily through de-industrialization and changes in energy policy unrelated to the parties' implementation efforts. 64 Subsequent Protocols developed specification standards in the form of recommendatory Annexes. These became progressively mandatory and stringent in nature. The regime has attempted to prioritize precision over vagueness but, inevitably, flexible standards have been deployed when negotiating parties could not agree on firm rules. Yet, overall, greater precision has increased effectiveness by reducing uncertainty and making cases of non-compliance more readily observable. 65 The regime conforms to the idea of trade-offs, with a core group prepared to move forward on emissions reductions even though a sizeable number of states may not ratify the Protocols. This may be a better outcome for the environment than the alternativenamely the possibility that no international standards are adopted.
The regime adopts a cautious approach towards the application of international environmental law principles to LRTAP. The Trail Smelter Arbitration is a precedent; 66 the emergence of the 'no harm' principle contained in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration 1972 67 had a clear influence (repeated in the CLRTAP Preamble), but more recent principles feature less prominently. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 68 and the concept of sustainable 62 N. 31 above. 63 The participation of the USSR was only secured with the inclusion of 'transboundary fluxes', as the majority of its emissions did not affect neighbouring countries because of the 'prevailing westerly winds': McCormick, n. 21 development 69 are under-represented in the legal agreements. The provisions on information exchange and consultation notwithstanding, formal obligations to undertake environmental impact assessments are absent. 70 The regime has incorporated precautionary approaches in the Preambles to the Protocols from 1994 onwards. 71 Because the science is well established for the specified pollutants, scientific uncertainty is now rarely cited as a reason for delaying action on LRTAP. 72 Environmental principles mostly emerged after the CLRTAP was adopted. Later Protocols failed to integrate them substantially. This results in a significant degree of ambiguity concerning their role, and influences implementation strategies. Nonetheless, the regime has been relatively successful in using precise rules and a narrow understanding of environmental principles. However, it is argued that the incorporation of the remaining environmental principles would reduce ambiguity and therefore increase effectiveness.
Implementation Strategies
The LRTAP regime has developed a firm basis in command-and-control techniques. 73 In the 1979 Convention, states could only agree on a generic performance standard for national control measures based on the concept of best available technology economically feasible (the BATEF standard). 74 The 30% reduction target applicable to all states in the 1985 Sulphur Protocol I 75 was considered too inflexible to achieve higher sulphur emissions reductions, although the target was achieved. 76 Technologyspecific and environmental quality requirements were necessary, but politically difficult to achieve. Signatory states needed to balance sovereignty concerns and the accommodation of national industries and interests with the need for a level playing field and a greater focus on environmental vulnerability. The argument shifted in favour of standardization and environmental quality, but the tension has never been fully resolved. The 1988 NO X Protocol 77 included the 'critical loads' concept, whereby European areas are given a 'quantitative estimate of the exposure to one or more pollutants below which significant harmful effects on specified sensitive elements of the environment do not occur according to present knowledge'. 78 The 1994 Sulphur Protocol II 79 and the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol 80 integrated these environmental quality standards and introduced a general commitment not to exceed critical loads in the long term. 81 Critical loads are applied to the management of acidity and nutrient nitrogen (sulphur and nitrogen). The 'critical levels' concept was also developed. This focuses on the health and environmental effects of exposure to pollutant concentrations in the atmosphere, an approach used for ground-level ozone, particulate matter, and ammonia. 82 For the remaining pollutants, the regime has used traditional approaches of bans, phase-outs, limits, and restricted use, mainly as a result of the availability of alternatives. 83 Haas and McCabe argue that the critical loads approach was 'virtually revolutionary in diplomacy', 84 because it attempted to assign national targets according to environmental vulnerability. The translation into policy occurred through integrated assessment models, such as the Regional Acidification Information System (RAINS) models. 85 The models were developed in close cooperation with scientists and policy makers, and had 'considerable credibility'. 86 Institutional support through workshops of the Working Group on Strategies, together with the use of three models, fostered respect for the process and contributed to an impression of flexibility. 87 However, although RAINS modelled least cost-reduction scenarios, and the 5% most sensitive areas in each grid of the critical loads map were excluded from the reduction targets on the ground of costs, 88 the states negotiated a weaker general emissions reduction target in the 1994 Sulphur Protocol II, again citing costs.
The Protocol aimed to reduce the gap between critical loads and emissions by 60% (60% gap closure). 89 Gap closure was referred to again in the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol. Because of these compromises, the regime could be criticized for being biased towards economic concerns, rather than achieving optimal environmental outcomes. 90 The European Commission was so dissatisfied with the Gothenburg Protocol's emissions reduction commitments, for example, that it did not sign it. 91 The EU acceded in 2003, after the adoption of more stringent NECs in Directive 2001/81/EC, 92 reasoning that implementation of the Gothenburg Protocol would 'contribute to achieving Community goals for protection of the environment and human health'. 93 Scientific uncertainty regarding critical loads also remains an issue, and precaution is needed when considering the exceedance boundaries. 94 Despite these concerns, the critical loads approach remains a superior method to the politically unpalatable acrossthe-board imposition of emissions reduction. If the gap between emissions and critical loads is successfully closed, it will be a remarkable achievement.
The During the early period of the regime, this standard offered a viable route to achieving reductions, but the limits are being reached. 97 The BATEF standard has attracted criticism because it enables states to prioritize economic considerations over environmental outcomes, depending on the weighting. It may thus serve to justify inaction by those unwilling to invest in pollution abatement measures. 98 The shift to the term 'best available techniques' (BAT) has somewhat diffused this criticism, and commitments to promote renewable energy were finally included in the 1994 Sulphur Protocol II. 99 Kelly and his co-authors suggest that to remain effective, the LRTAP regime is likely to need to embrace 'alternative approaches to emission reductions'. 100 Furthermore, as Kütting has noted, the 'predominance of fossil fuels' in the UNECE economies has not been significantly questioned. 101 The 1999 Gothenburg Protocol expanded implementation strategies by simultaneously attempting to regulate sulphur, NO X , VOCs and ammonia emissions (hence, it has been described as the Multi-Effect Protocol). Flexible approaches to reductions were tentatively included, such as the recommended VOC reduction-offsetting scheme. 102 There are no provisions for international emissions trading, although some states have implemented national schemes. 103 The Executive Body (EB) has issued guidance on the various options, including the possibility of achieving co-benefits on climate change with the EU emissions trading scheme. 104 The Protocol requires states to phase out market-based incentives for the regulated pollutants (such as tax exemptions and subsidies). 105 Thus, to an extent, structural issues are now being addressed.
The recent Protocol amendments have not diverged from this regulatory approach. The 2009 POPs Protocol amendments put in place further restrictions and regulate additional POPs, provide new emission limit values for waste incineration, and provide BAT guidance to control emissions. 106 amendments provide stricter emission limit values for the specified sources, and extend the source categories. 107 The 2012 Gothenburg Protocol amendments set new 2020 emissions ceilings for existing pollutants as well as for PM and black soot. 108 Economic uncertainty and austerity, however, led states to water down their commitments in line with economic projections to 2020. The 2012 Gothenburg Protocol amendments do not appear to have gone much further than business-asusual. 109 As Ågren notes, it is 'a great disappointment that the overall level of ambition is still far from sufficient to adequately protect health and the environment'. 110 There is no definitive answer to which regulatory approach is more effective (command-and-control or market-based), nor whether it is better to have a regulatory mix. As Bodansky notes, the problem 'lies less in formulating desirable policy options than in getting these policies adopted and implemented'. 111 For this reason, assessing the effectiveness of the commitments is difficult because ultimately their success relies on political will. This analysis points to a certain degree of muddling through, and highlights the trade-offs made to achieve agreement. States cannot be prevented from negotiating weaker reduction commitments, and the effectsbased approach to LRTAP was not a complete solution to state ambivalence. The regime has an unfortunate dynamic whereby the required emissions reductions are perhaps too lenient for developed states, but are perceived by the states with economies in transition (EIT) as complex and costly to implement. 112 This is particularly concerning if we recall that the LRTAP regime is weak in terms of recognizing common but differentiated responsibilities. Thus, in adopting relatively advanced implementation strategies, a degree of state participation may have been sacrificed.
effectiveness and institutional design of the lrtap regime

The Core Institutions
The core institutional feature established by the CLRTAP was the EB, with its subsidiary bodies and Bureau (an inter-sessional forum). 113 The European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP) has also been a key supporting body. 114 The Executive Secretary of the UNECE is designated the Secretariat, with the Secretariat functions provided by the Air Pollution Section of the UNECE Environment and Human Settlement Division. 115 Currently there are three subsidiary bodies to the EB: (i) the Working Group on Effects (WGE); 116 (ii) the EMEP Steering Body, 117 with four task forces and four EMEP Centres; 118 and (iii) the Working Group on Strategies and Review (WGSR), the principal negotiating body. 119 The regime has a well-developed institutional framework, is supported by a range of subsidiary bodies, and has established links with international institutions. Studies focusing on the regime's early period (the 1980s and 1990s) have viewed it as institutionally effective and dynamic. 120 Indeed, the initial institutional framework contributed to the regime's later successes. The institutions are viewed as having aided state cooperation, consensus, and the negotiation of the Protocols. 121 The WGSR has been particularly important for the interaction of science and policy. 122 The subsidiary bodies have benefited from a relatively good exchange of information through national reporting, which has aided transparency. This has enabled 113 Art. 10 CLRTAP. The EB is composed of representatives of the parties to the Convention, and meets at least annually. It is responsible for implementation and review: see http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/ executivebody/welcome.html. The Bureau consists of the EB Chair and seven Vice-Chairs (including the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies). Its focus is on strategy, coordination and cooperation, and it may submit policy proposals to the EB: see http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/executivebody/ebbureauhome.html. 114 methodological harmonization and the development and implementation of the critical loads/levels approach. 123 The regime is considered one of the most 'sciencebased' in existence, and could be held up as a 'model' in this regard. 124 A limitation of the regime is that no central funding mechanism exists. This arrangement has not kept pace with the regime's evolution and possibly jeopardizes its institutional effectiveness. EMEP has a skewed funding system that relies mainly on mandatory contributions from a few lead states (such as France, Germany, and the UK). The majority of non-EMEP activities have been funded by donor countries, or through the UNECE's limited resources. The Secretariat relies on these resources. 125 It has been 'overworked' and has struggled at times to attend meetings in host states. 126 Despite these limitations, it has reportedly performed its functions relatively successfully. 127 The funding issue reflects the reluctant agreement reached during the Convention negotiations and the state-centric approach taken by the parties. 128 Although aware of this weakness, in the early 2000s the parties failed to create a centralized funding mechanism to distribute costs more fairly; 129 instead, all parties were asked to contribute to the non-EMEP core activities. 130 To this end, the EB provided guidelines that followed the allocation methods for the revised contributions to the 1984 EMEP Protocol. 131 However, these measures were inadequate and, in 2010, the new CLRTAP Long-term Strategy and Implementation Action Plan reiterated the need for adequate funding of non-EMEP core activities and of the Secretariat. 132 Estimates in the 2014-15 Implementation Work Plan 133 indicated a budget shortfall of at least US$1 million. The regime remains underfunded, and is arguably less effective consequently.
Funding weaknesses may be problematic if the regime attempts to create institutional connections between other MEAs, or conduct outreach and knowledgesharing activities in the wider UNECE area/developing world (as promoted by the Global Atmospheric Pollution (GAP) Forum). 134 With regard to Europe, this issue has created fewer difficulties. For example, in 1989 the UNECE and the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation with regard to data on airborne pollution. 135 Furthermore, scientific collaboration has occurred through involvement in the Task Force on Hemispheric Air Pollution, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the GAP Forum. 136 According to Reis and his co-authors, the Task Force on Reactive Nitrogen has developed 'partnerships with UNEP and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, as well as the biodiversity and water conventions'. 137 Such efforts need to be intensified; this will require enhanced cooperation at a high institutional level and, consequently, better funding.
When considering the criteria for effectiveness, the CLRTAP highlights that although we can take a holistic approach, not all criteria are equalsuccessfully formed and functioning institutions are crucial. On a basic level the institutions function well; however, opportunities for expanded activities are limited, and this may reduce effectiveness in the long term.
International Implementation Procedures
Dispute settlement
The Convention contained no process for third-party settlement, and only required parties to seek a solution by negotiation or by any other acceptable method. 138 This formulation was repeated verbatim in the Protocols up to the 1994 Sulphur Protocol II, which added the possibility of submitting disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). If states cannot agree on the mode of dispute settlement, they are required to submit the dispute to a conciliation commission if requested by a party to the dispute. The commission may make a recommendatory award if appropriate, to be respected in good faith. 139 However, as is the case with numerous MEAs, no formal disputes have arisen. 140 The procedure possibly acts as an incentive to avoid disputes and contributes to the culture of consensus. Alternatively, it may be that dispute settlement provisions play a minimal role in determining the effectiveness of the regime. 141 Reporting, review, and non-compliance procedures Reporting contributes to the regime's effectiveness as it promotes transparency and is an integral component of the compliance procedures. Initially framed as a requirement to exchange available information in Article 8 of the Convention, the 1985 Sulphur Protocol I established dual reporting commitments with regard to national emissions data and information on the programmes, policies and strategies undertaken to achieve the Protocol's commitments. 142 As implementation strategies became more complex, states were required to report on the implementation of their commitments under the Protocols in general. 143 The annual national reports and the 'major reviews' of Strategies and Policies for Air Pollution Abatement, which are undertaken every four years, can be used for naming-and-shaming, although they are not intended for this purpose. 144 Data transparency is further aided by the collaboration between the EMEP Centre on Emission Inventories and Projections and the EEA, which enables the publication of the Air Pollutant Emission Inventory Guidebook (formally CORe INventory AIR), 145 and also through the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR). 146 The register collects data for a range of pollutants (such as those resulting in LRTAP and climate change) by industrial source.
The Convention provided no clear non-compliance procedures. A major development was the establishment of the Implementation Committee (IC) by the 1994 Sulphur Protocol II, which became the compliance procedure for all Protocols. 147 It was modelled on the IC of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 148 which was developed in 1990-92. 149 Its functions include (i) the review of compliance with reporting obligations; (ii) consideration of submissions or referrals, 150 with the adoption of any necessary reports or recommendations; (iii) the preparation of detailed compliance reports on specific obligations; (iv) consideration of systemic compliance issues; and (v) the production of annual compliance reports for the EB, with recommendations if necessary. The EB may then adopt a decision on the non-compliance. 151 The IC takes a facilitative and cooperative approach to non-compliance. Namingand-shaming happens in the EB decisions, which adopt language such as 'express disappointment' and 'note with concern'. 152 EB decisions are likely to have the most impact at state level, while the use of official international diplomatic routes and publicity on the UNECE website may have a broader, if modest, outreach to the public and the media. The activities of the IC notably improved the levels of reporting after its first compliance review 153for example, reporting for the 1988 NO X Protocol increased from 82% in 1998 to 99% in 2003. 154 Serious cases of non-compliance have been rare, although the IC has dealt with some lengthy periods of non-compliance by individual states, which have attracted repeated EB decisions (see Table 1 at Appendix below). It is highly unlikely that the naming-and-shaming approach will harden to include sanctions, 155 while a further strengthening of the reporting requirements will only go so far in achieving compliance with the reduction commitments. 156 In Eastern Europe, EU expansion is bringing greater indirect incentives for compliance, as states that do not comply with the LRTAP-related Directives may be referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 157 Most scholars have concluded that the IC is effective, compliance levels have improved, and most states implement the IC's recommendations. 158 4. the normative effectiveness of the lrtap regime
Legitimacy -Rules on Decision Making and Participation
According to Bodansky, the legitimacy of international environmental law is derived through consensus, with states negotiating rules that they believe are fair and 'in their self-interest', rather than through a recognition of 'the rulemaking authority of international institutions'. 159 Based on state practice, the regime has high legitimacy because states have been committed to the process for the past 35 years, during which time significant legal codification has occurred.
Decision making is a key determinant of whether states view the process as legitimate. 160 Decision making by consensus provides greater legitimacy than majority voting as common ground between states is found. However, it may slow the rate of response to new developments and may lead to lowest-commondenominator agreements, which are unambitious or ambiguous if they attempt to include a range of competing state positions. 161 Majority voting provides greater flexibility, but can lead to states opting out if allowed to. 162 The CLRTAP resulted from consensus-based decision making, and embedded this approach. 163 Although the EB decided to adopt the UNECE rules of procedure, which operate by majority vote, for most of their history the Convention bodies have decided by consensus to further the spirit of cooperation (although unanimity is not required). 164 This approach did not achieve full ratification levels, but it secured the participation of the willing, avoided conflict and therefore increased legitimacy. 165 It did not prevent the 1980s Protocols from being considered lowest-common-denominator agreements, although this is understandable given the Cold War context and the reluctance by the polluting states to undertake international commitments. 166 In 2010, the EB adopted new rules of procedure for its sessions, which suggest that majority voting may play an increased role in the regime. 167 Participation is limited to the Member States and states with consultative status to the UNECE. 168 States must be a party to the CLRTAP to participate in the Protocols. UNECE plays an important facilitative role and arguably provides a greater sense of legitimacy and support to the Convention process. 169 The symbolic and political value of the East-West membership was a great asset. 170 The recognition of the EU (then the EEC) as a signatory to CLRTAP and subsequent Protocols was considered a diplomatic breakthrough and a significant episode of détente in the Cold War. 171 From the 1990s onwards, as the problem of hemispheric air pollution (POPs, mercury, ozone, and particulate matter) gained prominence, 172 the possibility was mooted to amend the legal instruments so that states outside the UNECE region (such as the Eastern Asia states) could participate in the regime. However, achieving consensus on this issue was viewed as unlikely and time-intensive. 173 The UNECE membership criterion has possibly been a limiting factor in the post-Cold war era, and highlights the need for global rather than regional approaches. 174 The 1998 POPs Protocol 175 had a substantial awareness-raising impact and was a contributing factor to the successful adoption, in 2001, of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. 176 The 1998 Heavy Metals Protocol 177 influenced the 2013 Minamata Convention on Mercury, which addresses the intercontinental transport of mercury. 178 The regional agreements, programmes and action plans that were developed through UNEP in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, after the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED or Rio Earth Summit) 179 have broadly treated the CLRTAP as an exemplary system. The main components for emulation are cooperation and the need for adequate air pollution monitoring. 180 The UN International Law Commission (ILC) has recently begun preparatory work for global draft articles on the 'protection of the atmosphere'; the CLRTAP features in this work. 181 If the CLRTAP participation rules are a limitation, they have not precluded the parties from promulgating international law in other forums. As a precedent, the regime has contributed to the adoption of global treaties and rules on air pollution.
State Participation
Not all parties to the CLRTAP have ratified every Protocol. By 1988, the Convention had 35 signatories and 32 parties. 182 An important event in the regime's history was the string of accessions to the Convention by the newly independent states (NIS) in Eastern Europe during the early 1990s. With the break-up of the Soviet Union (USSR) and Yugoslavia, there are now 51 parties, including nearly every Western European state, Turkey, the majority of the EECCA states, the US, and Canada. 183 A smaller group has ratified the Protocols. The advanced economies of Western Europe have ratified all, or nearly all, of the Protocols. The smaller economies have selectively ratified, primarily because of concerns over their stringency, the cost of compliance, and the impact on their industrial development (Ireland and Greece, for example). A small number of states (such as Turkey) have not ratified any pollution-specific Protocols. However, all of the Protocols have entered into force, which is an exceptional achievement. Hopefully, the recent amendments will achieve a similar level of support.
178 Minamata (Japan), 10 Oct. 2013 , not yet in force, available at: http://www.mercuryconvention.org. 179 Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 3-14 June 1992, available at: http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html. 180 There is a distinct North American approach to LRTAP because of the continent's geography, of which the CLRTAP is a component. 184 The US and Canada have selectively ratified the Protocols, preferring to find bilateral solutions. 185 The US has also engaged in agreements with Mexico. 186 In general, US domestic politics dictated action on LRTAP in North America, although the regime may have contributed to awareness raising. 187 Bilateral agreements exist also in Europe, for example, between Finland and Russia. 188 Moreover, the development of EU environmental law has created overlapping obligations for the Member States (see Section 2.1 above). Participation in the regime therefore should be seen as nested within a framework of international and European bilateral law and policy, driven by the national context.
Efforts to include the EIT/EECCA countries have achieved mixed results. The EU has had some influence on participation levels with regard to the Protocols. Evidence suggests that ratification by Eastern European countries is often influenced by impending EU membership. 189 Turkey, a long-standing candidate country, has barely engaged with the regime. In its view, 'due regard' should be given to its status as a developing country, a position whereby it exempts itself from accepting international standards. 190 Russia, Belarus and Ukraine ceased to ratify the Protocols created after 1990, while Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the states of the Southern Caucasus have only ratified the Convention. The end of Cold War diplomacy, which had secured Soviet participation, partly explains these outcomes. They are also a legacy of the USSR's sole focus on controlling emissions near the European border. Furthermore, LRTAP was of minor importance to the NIS, and the leading European states were indifferent to LRTAP contained in the Eastern UNECE regions. Consequently, the less developed states in the Eastern region did not receive adequate financial assistance, technology transfer or joint implementation. 191 Despite gaining around 15 new parties to the CLRTAP, a third of UNECE members have not engaged with the Protocols; however, their decision not to participate has come at a price: a loss of influence in the regime, particularly in the case of Russia. 192 State participation is a key area where the regime needs to make substantial improvements. This issue has undermined environmental effectiveness, as these states are subject only to minimal obligations to control, reduce and prevent LRTAP.
Assignment of Implementation Responsibilities and the Degree of Burden Sharing
The CLRTAP was intentionally liability-neutral and the extent to which responsibility has been addressed is open to interpretation. 193 A key point for investigation is whether states with the highest capacity and inclination to comply carry the greatest burden, as this arguably strengthens the regime's effectiveness. 194 Initially this was not the case: the early Protocols allocated the same emissions reduction percentage to all states. As the regime developed, the emergence of differentiated targets attempted to reconcile economic considerations with environmental vulnerability and political will. The development of flexible emissions management areas for VOCs and sulphur fostered participation by Canada and Norway, and enabled them to focus on LRTAP with less stringent commitments for the rest of their territories. Although the development of NECs enabled greater implementation responsibilities to be assigned to Western European states, the commitments for the highly polluting EIT states do not conform with the idea of burden sharing, as the latter lack both the capacity and the inclination to comply. 195 The 1991 VOCs Protocol 196 and the 1994 Sulphur Protocol II 197 introduced differentiated targets. For example, those states with the greatest inclination and capacity to reduce sulphur emissions, such as Germany and the Nordic states, took an ambitious NEC equivalent to a reduction of around 80% of 1980 levels by 2000. France and the UK obtained a ten-year extension to achieve a similar reduction. Highly polluting EIT states also received additional time, but cost efficiency and environmental criteria apparently overrode considerations of capacity and inclination.
For example, Poland needed to reduce emissions by around 66% to reach its 2010 ceiling. RAINS modelling had demonstrated that large reductions in Poland would achieve the greatest cost efficiency. 198 However, in the early 1990s, the Polish economy was relatively weak (as were most of the NIS), whilst the post-Communist government faced significant governance challenges 199 and would have struggled to invest more in order to reach its target without increased donor support. The fairness of the targets was therefore questionable, and many highly polluting EIT countries chose not to participate. Whether this justifies Poland's continued ambivalence to the LRTAP regime in 2014, after ten years of EU membership, is a different matter.
Differentiated targets have become a feature of the regime, with mixed results in terms of ratification. The 1998 Heavy Metals Protocol 200 allowed the EIT countries ten instead of five years in which to achieve compliance with the product control measures. 201 The 2012 amendments of the Heavy Metals Protocol 202 and the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol 203 introduced further differentials to appeal specifically to new parties to the Protocol. The Gothenburg Protocol affords new parties an extension for the development of implementation plans with a final implementation deadline of 31 December 2030. 204 The 2012 amendments to the Heavy Metals Protocol contained similar extensions for the implementation of BAT and limit values to existing stationary sources. 205 Such differential targets may produce better environmental outcomes in the long term if these measures are sufficiently attractive to prospective parties.
Financial assistance
A cost-sharing mechanism or specific provisions on the transfer of technology to the non-EU EECCA countries could offset the weaknesses of the regime's regulatory approach, increase ratification and the implementation of the Protocols, and produce better environmental outcomes. 206 These have not been established, even though the EB has explored the possibility of financial mechanisms. There is a limit to the regime's ability to foster cooperation. Since the mid-1990s, the parties have been invited to contribute to the Trust Fund so that the participation of one government representative from each of the EIT states can be funded; 207 this appears to have increased their participation in the negotiations. 208 The 2010 Long-term Strategy reiterated the need for adequate funding to improve participation, and Decision 2012/26 called for a high-level meeting on actions to promote better air quality within the countries of EECCA. 209 The creation of the EECCA Coordinating Group in 2011, which focuses on the Russian sphere of influence, is a significant step towards creating a dual process that may lead to greater participation. Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova have signalled their intention to become parties to the later Protocols, 210 but Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are unlikely to do so in the short term. 211 Donor countries, EU-sponsored projects, and the UN Development Account (UNDA) provide support for projects in the EECCA countries. These projects have concentrated on the creation of emissions inventories, monitoring, and the ratification of the most recent Protocols. 212 Although a useful first step, programmes with greater ambition are needed. The absence of burden sharing through a funding mechanism or a formal system of joint implementation to aid the least developed states in the UNECE area has reduced effectiveness. 213 
The Empowerment of Domestic Stakeholders
Prior to the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol, the regime contained no specific provisions on public access to information. This Protocol required states to 'promote' the provision of information to the general public on issues such as national annual emissions, compliance information, pollution levels, and the health and environmental effects of the pollutants. 214 While this was a significant development, it is somewhat undermined by its weak phraseology. The deficiency in provisions on public access to information arises partly out of the East-West politics of the early period of the LRTAP regime and the culture of industrial secrecy of the USSR. Moreover, environmental issues are politically sensitive and states may wish to control the flow of information. Nonetheless, as a result of the activities of the regime and the current emphasis on transparencyas embodied by the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 215 and its implementation in UNECE Member States including the EUthere is now a large amount of reported emissions data publically available.
Intergovernmental organizations, NGOs 216 and industrial groups may attend meetings as observers, whilst NGOs must have consultative status with the UNECE to attend working group meetings. 217 The unofficial Heads of Delegations meetings that take place during the negotiations of the Protocols have been 'exclusive', 218 and NGOs do not appear to have participated as observers of the work of the IC. 219 NGOs have a limited influence and no role in decision making. However, their involvement in the final negotiations might not produce better outcomes; it could slow the negotiation process or reduce the opportunities for diplomacy. 220 Domestic successes for NGOs occurred mainly in the early years of the regime, and some NGOs lobbied intensely for the ratification of the legal agreements. 221 The limited resources of NGOs, combined with the emergence of other environmental problems (such as climate change) and the increased role of the EU, saw NGOs switch their focus, although they have maintained an interest. 222 There is very little public participation in the regime. 223 The regime's engagement with industry groups in respect of the BATEF standard has produced some notable outcomes. Technical seminars brought together members of the industrial, scientific and policy-making communities, and enabled innovative technologies to be demonstrated as technically and economically feasible, thus aiding their deployment. 224 Industry groups have also been regular observers at LRTAP meetings and seminars.
The regime was the major source of information on LRTAP in the 1980s, although much of this information was inaccessible to the public. The internet may have increased accessibility, particularly in highly developed European states where internet usage is higher. 225 However, awareness of the Convention and LRTAP in general has declined across key stakeholder groups (the public, politicians and local NGOs, for example). 226 As Ågren has noted, the regime needs to improve communication to increase domestic knowledge and awareness of air pollution, while simultaneously raising its profile. Solutions for this problem, such as an effective communications strategy and a travel fund to aid the participation of NGOs, will require additional funding. 227 The 2010 Long-term Strategy and 2011 Action Plan has included the need for an improved communications strategy. 228 With the implementation of higher pollution reduction requirements in the next decade, success will depend more on public opinion and support. 229 It will be interesting to see whether the regime can avoid controversy, particularly in the context of European budget austerity.
Evaluating the empowerment of stakeholders is extremely difficult as much is out of the control of the LRTAP regime. However, beyond the provision of information, effective empowerment in the domestic process remains problematic.
conclusion
The combined approaches to effectiveness taken by Sand and Bodansky constitute a useful basis for the exploration of the LRTAP regime. This study has shown that compliance, institutional, and normative effectiveness can be measured reasonably well. In general, the LRTAP regime conforms to Bodansky's notion of 'trade-offs' and 'art and craft'.
The regime faces significant challenges concerning participation, implementation procedures, empowerment of domestic stakeholders, and funding. The most recent EMEP Status Reports indicate that, 230 although there is much to be optimistic about regarding the remarkable reductions in acidification, lead pollution, and certain POPs, significant progress still needs to made on eutrophication, ground level ozone, photochemical smog, PM, and heavy metals and POPs more generally.
With the increased role of the EU and the somewhat autonomous North American framework, it is difficult to ascribe an overall level of effectiveness to the regime as there is a significant degree of overlap. Nonetheless, the regime has shown that states can agree on contentious issues and achieve results. As a model regional MEA, the regime's replication in other regions may be problematic, especially for developing countries. States must have the necessary financial and administrative capacities to comply with this type of regime. The Convention's basic method of creating sound institutions, and its engagement with science, has nevertheless provided a model for subsequent international treaties. 226 Ågren, n. 48 above, at p. 137. 227 Ibid., at pp. 138 and 141. 228 N. 132 above. 229 
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Stabilize emissions or transboundary fluxes of NOX so they do not exceed 1987 levels by 1994. Unleaded fuel to be made available to allow the use of catalytic converters. 7 Moderate to high levels of compliance: the overall reduction was 9%. 8 All parties met their targets. 21 Protocol on Heavy Metals (1998 Heavy Metals Protocol). 22 33 Cadmium, lead, and mercury emissions to be controlled and reduced to the reference year (1990, or between 1985 and 1995). Emission limit values and best available techniques (BAT) to be applied, within set time-scales, to new and existing major stationary sources. Leaded petrol to be phased out.
Final deadline was end of 2011. Cyprus found in noncompliance with cadmium obligations. 23 From national reported data (1990-2011), lead emissions reduced by 90%, cadmium and mercury emissions by~60%. Deposition of lead reduced by 75%, cadmium by 51%, and mercury by 37%. 24 The difference between mercury emissions and deposition is as a result of intercontinental transport and natural sources.
